Appellate Division Holds VASPA Doesn’t Protect Against Bragging About One’s Sexual Prowess or Threatening to Contact an Employer

Enacted in May 2016, the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA) closed a statutory loophole in New Jersey in which protective orders weren’t available for survivors of sexual assault unless there was a charge or conviction. But the statute left another loophole in place: victims who were not in a familial or dating relationship with the offending actor could not seek protection against them through a protective order. Moreover, SASPA did not cover the crimes of stalking and cyber-harassment.

That changed with the passage of the Victim’s Assistance and Survivor Protection Act (VASPA), which became effective on January 1, 2024. Under VASPA, victims of stalking or cyber-harassment—as the New Jersey Criminal Code defines those crimes—can obtain a restraining order against the offending actor regardless of their relationship. When pursuing an action under VASPA, the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, which is the same standard as under the state’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.

Notably, VASPA permits “[a]ny person alleging to be a victim of . . . lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, or stalking or cyber-harassment, and who is not eligible for a restraining order” under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA) to seek a protective order. VASPA defines “lewdness” as “the exposing of the genitals for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person.” The statute defines “cyber-harassment” as

conduct that occurs, while making one or more communications in an online capacity via any electronic device or through a social networking site and with the purpose to harass another, that involves: threatening to inflict injury or physical harm to any person or the property of any person; knowingly sending, posting, commenting, requesting, suggesting, or proposing any lewd, indecent, or obscene material to or about a person with the intent to emotionally harm a reasonable person or place a reasonable person in fear of physical or emotional harm to the reasonable person; or threatening to commit any crime against a person or the person’s property.

In a reported decision that offers important guidance on protective orders under VASPA, the Appellate Division recently reversed a final protective order in A.C. v. R.S., No. A-1217-24. In doing so, the court held, among other things, that under VASPA not all sexual references were lewd, and threatening to contact someone’s employer and truthfully inform the employer about that person’s romantic relationship does not constitute cyber-harassment.

A woman confronts, online and off, her husband’s girlfriend

A.C. v. R.S. arose from a volatile situation involving a love triangle. The plaintiff was in a romantic relationship with the defendant’s husband while the defendant and her husband were going through a divorce. Late one night, the defendant appeared at the plaintiff’s home, rang the doorbell, and banged on windows, demanding the plaintiff come outside. After police intervened and the defendant left the scene, she sent a series of text messages around 2:00 a.m. to a group that included the plaintiff, the defendant, and the defendant’s husband.

The text messages included inflammatory statements and culminated in threats to contact both the plaintiff’s former employer (Essex County Department of Corrections) and her current employer to expose the relationship. The trial court granted a final protective order, finding the defendant had committed cyber-harassment by threatening harm to the plaintiff’s property (her employment) and by sending lewd comments.

The Appellate Division held that the defendant’s sexual text messages weren’t lewd, and threats to contact an employer about an actual relationship were not cyber-harassment

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court, making several key holdings.

First, the court reversed the trial court’s finding that the defendant engaged in lewdness. The defendant’s crude sexual comments in the text messages, according to the court, while inappropriate, did not constitute “exposing of the genitals for the purpose of arousing or gratifying” sexual desire as required by the statute. At best, according to the court, the defendant’s text messages were her “bragging about her sexual prowess.”

Second, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that SMS text messages cannot constitute cyber-harassment under VASPA because they don’t occur “online.” The court noted that text messages can be transmitted through various services, including SMS, MMS, and RCS, and that devices are “online” when connected to the internet or other networks. Since SMS messages can be transmitted online through various applications and computer-based messaging platforms, the court concluded they fall within VASPA’s scope. To hold otherwise would carve out one of the most popular forms of communication from the statute’s protection.

Third, the court, citing longstanding New Jersey precedent, acknowledged that “a calling, business or profession, chosen and followed, is property.” The court referenced McGowan v. O’Rourke, 391 N.J. Super 502 (App. Div. 2007), where a restraining order was upheld when a defendant threatened to send lewd pictures to the plaintiff’s employer.

Finally, the court held that not all threats to contact employers constitute cyber harassment. Under VASPA’s cyber-harassment provision, the communication must involve “threatening to inflict injury or physical harm to any person or the property of any person” or “threatening to commit any crime against a person or the person’s property.”

The court found that the defendant’s statement that she would contact the plaintiff’s employers did not qualify as cyber-harassment because it did not threaten to inflict injury or harm, nor did it threaten to commit a crime affecting the plaintiff’s job. The defendant merely intended to inform the employers about the plaintiff’s relationship with her husband—information that was truthful, not false or illicit.

The court distinguished this from McGowan, where the defendant threatened to provide employers with false or illicit information that would be injurious to the plaintiff. That scenario would constitute cyber-harassment; simply threatening to disclose a truthful romantic relationship does not.

What parties seeking protective orders under VASPA should know

This decision provides much-needed clarification for parties seeking protective orders and defendants facing such actions.

First, text messages are covered by VASPA’s cyber-harassment provisions, regardless of whether they’re sent through traditional SMS or internet-based messaging apps.

Second, employment is recognized as property that can be the subject of threats under VASPA.

Third, threatening to truthfully inform an employer about someone’s personal conduct does not rise to the level of cyber-harassment under the statute. There must be a threat to inflict injury or harm, or a threat to commit a crime.

Finally, context matters. The court distinguished between threatening to provide false or illicit information (which could be actionable) versus threatening to disclose truthful information about someone’s personal life (which is not).

This case reflects the courts’ careful balancing act in VASPA cases. While VASPA was designed to provide maximum protection to victims who fall outside the scope of the PDVA, courts must still ensure that the statutory requirements are met. Not every graphic sexual reference rises to lewdness under the law, nor does every threatening or harassing communication rise to the level of cyber-harassment.

For individuals involved in contentious situations, A.C. v. R.S. serves as a reminder that while emotional and inflammatory communications may be inappropriate and hurtful, they must meet specific legal standards to warrant a protective order. At the same time, the decision’s recognition that text messages constitute online communications under VASPA ensures the statute remains relevant in our digital age.

Reprinted with permission from the January 8, 2026, edition of the New Jersey Law Journal © 2026 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-257-3382 or reprints@alm.com.